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Abstract 
Classical economics works on the principle that individuals are rational and make decisions 
to maximize their self interest. However in real situations, individuals face a conflict between 
rational and irrational selves leading to decision making that does not leave them better off. 
Libertarian paternalism proposes a solution to this rationality problem in an individual by 
conceiving a choice architect. Choice architect is a third party capable of arriving at what a 
perfectly rational choice would be and ‘nudges’ an individual towards making that choice. 
Libertarian paternalists claim that choice architect does not interfere with the freedom of an 
individual because the choices he offers are easily reversible, i.e, an individual can reject it at 
any given point in time. Libertarian Paternalism seems to offer the third way between 
absolute autonomy of individual choice (libertarianism) and third party intervention 
(paternalism). This paper argues that the conception of a choice architect comes out of a hasty 
commitment to reconciling libertarianism and paternalism by placing perfect rationality and 
autonomy in two separate individuals in the case of a single decision making process. The 
paper proposes alternatives to confront the rationality problem. 
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Introduction 
Classical libertarians and paternalists look at individual as a decision maker from radically 
opposing perspectives. Classical libertarians argue that an individual ought to take complete 
and total responsibility for his actions. Paternalists, on the other hand, assert that it is 
impossible for an individual to choose what is intrinsically or instrumentally good for him. 
Dworkin (1972) defines paternalism as follows, ‘By paternalism I shall understand roughly 
the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to 
the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being coerced’. 
Paternalists, therefore, support third party intervention in individual decision making even 
against an individual’s will under certain conditions. Such justification is based on the 
assumption that the benefit of interference accrues to the same individual whose freedom has 
been tampered with. Between the extremes of libertarianism and paternalism, there have been 
arguments about the possibility of a third way. Libertarian paternalists claim to offer that 
third way. 
 
Earlier examination of human decision making had analysed the conflict of two ‘selves’ 
within individuals at the time of decision making- an intuitive self that takes quick decisions 
and a rational self that takes calculated decisions (Kahneman, 2002). The most notable 
advocates of libertarian paternalism, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, have based the 
justification of libertarian paternalism on the cognitive inconsistencies of individuals in 
Kahneman’s model. Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p.175) define libertarian paternalism as ‘the 
set of interventions aimed at overcoming the unavoidable cognitive biases and decisional 
inadequacies of an individual by exploiting them in such a way as to influence his decisions 
(in an easily reversible manner) towards choices that he himself would make if he had at his 
disposal unlimited time and information, and the analytic abilities of a rational decision-
maker.’ In other words, the central arguments of the libertarian paternalistic program are that 
(i) individuals display systematic cognitive deficiencies (ii) these cognitive deficiencies can 
be manipulated by third party interference that Thaler and Sunstein called ‘choice 
architecture’ (iii) choice architecture enables individual to make decisions that they would 
have themselves taken had they been perfectly rational, and (iv) these decisions once taken 
are easily reversible, i.e., the individual can reject the decision at any given point in time. 
This paper explores the philosophical foundations of libertarian paternalism. What are the 
core philosophical arguments that drive the major premises of libertarian paternalism, namely 
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the presence of choice architect and easy reversibility of choices? This paper argues that 
Thaler and Sunstein model reflects a hasty commitment to libertarian paternalism without 
probing alternatives. Their model attempts to conciliate perfect rationality and autonomy in 
two different individuals in the case of a single decision making process by the introduction 
of a choice architect. The paper points out the philosophical inconsistencies of libertarian 
paternalism and explores other possibilities to confront the ‘rationality problem’ based on 
Kahneman’s findings.  
Antecedents of libertarian paternalism 
Classical libertarian position is reflected in the utilitarian thinking of Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill. Utilitarians have argued the rationale of permitting absolute individual 
autonomy in decision making. Consequently, they were also absolute on their terms of anti-
paternalism. According to Mill, the freedom to choose is a good that was worth in itself 
compared to the wisdom of others or nature of the choice. He justified his stand on autonomy 
and individual agency thus, ‘A man's mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because 
it is best in itself, but because it is his own mode. . . .It is the privilege and proper condition of 
a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his 
own way’ (Mill, 1869). 
 
Even then, the perspective that paternalism can be allowed in special circumstances is not 
particularly new within the classical libertarian perspective. Hospers (1980) traces the 
evolution of libertarianism that accommodates paternalism to various degrees in the 
development of law. According to him, in the eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham himself 
categorised all laws into three broad kinds [i] laws that are designed to protect an individual 
from harm from others [ii] laws that are designed to protect an individual from harm induced 
by himself, and [iii] laws that are designed to cause benefits to others. The second category of 
laws was called ‘paternal’ laws because the state was attempting to mitigate harm done by an 
individual against his will and for his own good. This was the beginning of recognising legal 
paternalism in the utilitarian tradition.  
 
In due course, libertarians accommodated some categories of individuals on whose behalf 
some third party intervention was desirable in decision making. Children and infants were the 
first category of individuals who were thought of as incapable of assessing the full impacts of 
their own actions. The second category of people was the elderly who required help to 
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examine choices and take decisions made on the basis of the merits of choices. The third 
category of people was the mentally incompetent who was thought of deserving third party 
intervention in order to prevent harm to themselves and others. However, the definition of 
who was mentally incompetent was ambiguous. Yet, what was emerging was consensus that 
an end-based test, in this case ‘harm to one-self and others’ that could be an effective 
criterion to justify third party intervention. Legally, the term ‘harm’ was variously defined to 
include ‘bodily injury, damage to or theft of property and violation of contract’ (Hospers, 
1980). 
 
Even then, the question of ordinary normal adult and the possibility of exercising power over 
their decisions in certain conditions were open. Mill modified his stand on absolute anti-
paternalism by stating exceptions in two extreme instances- (i) in cases where an individual 
caused harm to others because of his decisions and (ii) in the case of a decision that 
exterminated liberty itself. Mill (1869) decisively wrote On Liberty that ‘The only purpose 
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or 
forbear because it will be better for him to do so,  because it will make him happier, because, 
in the opinion of others, to do so  would be wise, or even right’.  
 
Furthermore, Mill made an exception to paternalism in another case- that of preserving 
liberty itself. His argument was that liberty had to be preserved at all times. The basic 
premise here was that if liberty was available at time t1, then the libertarian stand was that it 
had to be preserved at all times t2,t3, t4...tn.. Mill gave two illustrations to make his point. The 
first was an instance when a person was selling himself off as a slave. He said that when it 
‘..is consideration for his liberty. . . . By selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; 
he foregoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, 
the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself. ...The 
principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is not freedom to 
be allowed to alienate his freedom.’ Another example where third party interference was 
justified by Mill was when a person was about to take his life. The argument was that this 
option would put an end to choices in the future. 
 
 
Therefore, some degree of paternalism within libertarian strand was tolerated toward ordinary 
individuals under certain conditions which were later referred to as ‘harm principles’. 
5 
 
Eventually not just the end-test of justifying paternalism, but the means-based criteria 
required qualification. Some parameters that were considered in this regard were [i] non 
coercion or voluntariness of the individual [ii] educated and informed consent of the 
individual concerned and [iii] healthy psychological state of the individual while making the 
decision. These criteria read very differently when defined narrowly. For example, the 
criterion of non-coercion can variously be defined as absence of threat, pressure or any kind 
of influence depending on how broad the scope of intervention is.  
 
What is interesting in the evolution of libertarian thought was that by paying attention to 
‘means’, the way ‘ends’ were perceived also changed. It was seen that there was a difference 
when paternalism was advocated when the third party (say, state) acts on an individual’s will 
to achieve its goals for him and when the party intervened to achieve the goals he would have 
set for himself.  It is the intervention of the latter kind that libertarian paternalism of Thaler 
and Sunstein aim for.  How they came about the particular version of libertarian paternalism 
requires close scrutiny. 
 
Confronting the rationality problem 
Before discussing the unique propositions of libertarian paternalism, it is important to 
understand what drives the model in the first place. Modern economic thinking rests on the 
assumption that individuals who make decisions are perfectly rational. A perfectly rational 
individual has unbounded time, information and will power to make decision that are self-
regarding and would maximise his self-interest. A rational individual’s preferences among an 
array of choices are both revealed and consistent. However, in reality, individuals make 
decisions that are inconsistent with maximising their self-interest because of imperfections in 
their rationality- absence of unbounded time, information and will power. This ‘rationality 
problem’ in an individual has engaged economic thinking extensively in modern times.  
The measurement of maximising self interest is done in terms of ‘utility’. The term ‘utility’ 
has had two distinct meanings in economic thinking. It was Jeremy Bentham who first used 
‘utility’ as the driving force behind individual action. Kahneman (2011) traces the 
Benthamite utility and concludes that according to Bentham,  human actions were derived out 
of commitment toward two sovereign masters- pain and pleasure- and they dictate what 
individuals ought to do  (ideal choices) and what individuals shall do (real choices). Rational 
choice theory uses ‘utility’ in an entirely different sense. According to them, utility is what 
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rationality dictates an individual to do, i.e., the choice that maximizes his self-interest and 
that which makes him better-off. It is implied that a rational individual would also want what 
he enjoys and would enjoy what he chooses, and in this way, also satisfies utility in the 
Benthamite hedonistic sense. Thus, Kahneman (2011) distinguished Benthamite utility as 
‘experiential utility’ and that defined by rational choice framework as ‘decisional utility’.  
Kahneman further argued that the cognitive inconsistency within an individual came out of 
two ‘systems’ of thinking. Libertarian paternalism is based entirely out of acknowledging this 
cognitive inconsistency and attempting to correct it with the help of a choice architect. Thaler 
and Sunstein (2008) take this idea of two systems of thinking to explain decisions that are 
irrational and justify the introduction of choice architect. In order to do this, they adopt the 
two systems of thinking proposed by Kahneman as system I and system II types. System I 
thinking is the automatic system of ‘uncontrolled, effortless, associative, fast, unconscious 
and skilled’ decision making while system II thinking is the reflective system of ‘controlled, 
effortful, deductive, slow, self-aware, rule following’ decision (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, 
p.20).  
Thaler and Sunstein then explain the interplay between two systems of thinking as two 
distinct ‘selves’ within the same person. Rebonato (2013) brings out the conundrum that 
libertarian paternalists face at this point. Similar to the externality problem in classical 
economics, libertarian paternalists face an ‘internality’ problem. Externality is when the 
action of an individual causes damage to another individual for which he does not get 
adequately compensated. Similarly, internality is when system I thinking overpowers system 
II thinking leading to preferences that are not perfectly rational. The implication of internality 
is that individuals take decisions that might not be in their self interest. Faced with the 
intrapersonal comparisons of utility of the two different selves, libertarian paternalists choose 
to prefer the choices that a rational self (system II thinking) would make. One of the 
philosophical justifications of ‘nudging’ through the choice architect is through what the 
libertarian paternalist describes as overcoming this internality problem.  
 
Unique propositions of libertarian paternalism 
The need for a choice architect in libertarian paternalist model comes out of privileging 
rational self over the less rational self. Furthermore, the external choice architect is forced to 
make these choices on behalf of system II. This is because a libertarian paternalist is not in a 
position to ask the individual freely what his preference would be because revealed 
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preference does not lead to preferred outcomes in the presence of system I thinking. The 
possibility of observing the individual while making decisions is also ruled out because it 
interferes with the neutrality of the choice architect. Therefore, the attempt of the choice 
architect is to ultimately reach the preference of a perfectly rational individual. 
Having come to the that choice architect is inevitable and has to force rational choice on an 
individual decision maker, libertarian paternalist is left with little choice but to work at the 
libertarian part to make the entire project palatable. Libertarian paternalists achieve this by 
arguing about the easy reversibility of choices set for an individual.  The easy reversibility of 
decisions presented in choice architecture also means that it is possible to reject the course 
offered in a choice architecture. Libertarian paternalists claim that easy reversibility makes 
choice architecture equivalent to not curtailing individual autonomy in decision making.  
Thus, there are two propositions implied in the libertarian paternalist model. One is the 
implicit privileging of the rational self over the less rational self. The reasons for preferring 
rational self are the attributes perfectly rational individuals have - that of revealed consistent 
preferences that maximizes self-interest. Second, is the assumption of consistent decisional 
irrationality in individuals that would make choice architect necessary and effective.  
Rebonato (2013) brings out these conditions where choice architect would be able to 
intervene. To begin with, there must be a decisional irrationality that displays regularities 
whose outcome is necessarily bad for the individual. It must be possible for the choices to be 
steered towards a different outcome. The choice architect must be able to decipher what the 
individual would ultimately prefer, inclined to make a ‘nudge’ that guides the individual 
towards this preference and that would be better than what a rationally bound agent would 
obtain. In the absence of these conditions, choice architect cannot perform what he is 
mandated.  
Alternatives from Kahneman’s vantage point 
The problem of the choice architect, who is forced to conciliate the value of perfect 
rationality while giving autonomy to individual decision maker, is one of hasty compromise 
reached by Thaler and Sunstein while proposing libertarian paternalism. For a moment, 
accepting the two systems of thinking proposed by Kahneman and a prima facie commitment 
that rational choices are better than other kinds of choices, what are the possible methods to 
overcome the problem of cognitive inconsistency that lead to less-than-rational choices of 
individuals? 
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One way to think about the problem is to return to the vantage point of Kahneman and 
closely examine the various types of cognitive deficiencies that he illustrates. There are two 
directions available here. One is to think through minimizing the cognitive deficiencies 
through information networks.  Dawes (1971) had proposed that introduction of linear model 
of choices rather than an array of choices help individuals in making choices that are 
consistent with the preferences of system II thinking. In another instance, partial ‘debiasing’ 
of errors has been achieved by group decisions than individual decision making in various 
situations (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The process of viewing options jointly than 
separately and understanding the underlying principles than surface assumptions greatly 
encourage moving toward a system II type of thinking. Fischhoff (1982) reviewed four 
strategies to overcome decision making bias- offer warning about the possibility of bias, offer 
direction of the bias, offer feedback loops to correct bias, and extended training to minimize 
the decisional bias. Another well known example of cognitive bias is through ‘framing effect’ 
in which individuals respond differently to a choice based on the way they are framed. 
Experiments have proven that framing effects can be greatly diminished while observed in 
social context and through providing external credible advice (Druckman, 2001). Therefore, a 
number of information network strategies might be effective in reducing decision making 
bias without compromising on the transparency of the process.   
The second set of alternatives available is to reconfigure the understanding of rationality 
itself.  Sen (2004) describes rationality as the need to subject one’s choices to the demands of 
reason. This definition significantly moves from the understanding of rationality as self 
regarding, utility maximizing choices that expected utility theory defines. Sen’s definition of 
rationality involves individual’s scrutiny of goals (values and wants) that might be acting out 
of self-interest, commitment (doing something right) or altruistic ends (doing something for 
others). Making the definition of rationality broader can reconcile system I and system II 
types of thinking and also the conflict between values of autonomy of libertarians with 
intervention of paternalists. According to a perspective that identifies rationality as the test of 
reasonableness, rationality is freedom. 
Conclusion 
Cognitive deficiencies of individuals have been identified as one of the reasons for deviation 
of preferences from the predicted responses of expected rational utility theory. Thaler and 
Sunstein proposed the presence of a choice architect who would nudge an individual toward 
9 
 
choices that he himself would have taken had he been perfectly rational. The presence of an 
external choice architect intervening with the autonomy of individuals is overcome by the 
proposition that the choices presented are ‘easily reversible’. But a choice architect can 
provide easily reversible choices only under certain conditions that are difficult to meet. This 
paper argues that there are alternatives available to rectify the cognitive inconsistencies of an 
individual decision maker rather than resort to the uneasy compromise that libertarian 
paternalists propose.  
One set of alternatives looks at providing information network to an individual decision 
maker to make better choices. Presence of information, linear modelling of presentation, 
feedback loops, training, credible advice and group decision making diminishes the effects of 
cognitive bias to a large extent. The second set of alternatives looks at rationality as a test of 
reasonableness embracing the ideas of conflicting values (self regarding/other regarding) in 
individual decision making.  
The cost of cognitive deficiency in decision is increasing due to the impact of decisions on 
private and public resources. While thinking of correcting systematic deficiencies, it is 
important to understand that new designs would be implemented in political economies 
where accountability and transparency of the system is as valuable as the end results of 
decision making. Confronting the rationality problem requires renewed thinking in the 
emerging contexts.  
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